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Abstract 
 
We investigate the impact of the banking reform started from 2005 on ownership structures in 
China on commercial bankV¶ profitability, efficiency and risk over the period 2000-2012, 
providing comprehensive evidence on the impact of banking reform in China. We find that 
banks on average tend to have higher profitability, lower risk and lower efficiency after the 
reforms, and the results are robust with our difference-in-difference approach. Our results 
also show that the Big 5 state-owned banks underperform banks with other types of 
ownership when risk is measured by non-performing loans (NPLs) over the entire study 
period, but tend to have fewer NPLs than other banks during the post-reform period. Our 
results provide some supporting evidence on the ongoing banking reforms in China, 
suggesting that attracting strategic foreign investors and listing state-owned banks on stock 
exchanges appear to be effective ways to help state-owned banks deal with the problem of 
NPLs and manage their risk.  
 
 
 
 
Key words: Bank reforms, performance, efficiency, risk, ownership structure 
JEL classification: G21, G28, G32 
 
                                                          

 Corresponding author: Frank Hong Liu, University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School, Room 471, 
Gilbert Scott Building, Glasgow G12 8QQ, E-Mail: Hong.Liu@glasgow.ac.uk. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The Chinese economy has global significance, and the banking system in China plays a 
crucial role in maintaining a healthy economy. Since 1978, the Chinese banking sector has 
undergone significant reforms to transform the sector into a modern banking system based on 
market and profitability functions (García-Herrero, Gavilá, and Santabárbara 2009). The 
process of reform has been accelerated after China joined the WTO at the end of 2001.   
Differing from banking reforms in transition economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe, where new banking systems were created, Chinese banking reform tends to be more 
gradual (Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013). Because the banking reform in China appears to have 
tremendous success in risk management and performance and efficiency improvement (e.g., 
Wang et al. 2014; Allen et al. 2014), experiences and lessons from China will be of particular 
interest to other transition economies (Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013). 
A number of studies have examined KRZ&KLQHVHEDQNV¶SHUIRUPDQFHKDVUHVSRQGHG
to banking reforms. However, most of them used data prior to the great financial crisis of 
2007. Since 2005, remarkable changes of ownership structure (e.g., encouraging foreign 
investments and public listing) have been seen in major Chinese banks, but little is known 
about the impact of such reform. Although a few studies have investigated how Chinese 
banks performed after 2005, they tend to focus on large, either state-owned or joint-stock 
commercial banks (e.g., Allen et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2014). This paper attempts to address 
the changes in the performance and risk levels of different types of Chinese banks over the 
period of 2000-2012, with particular interest in the year of 2005 when radical reform 
measures were adopted.  It contributes to the literature in several ways.  
First, previous studies of banking reforms focus mainly on the profitability and/or 
efficiency of Chinese banks (e.g., Heffernan and Fu 2010; Deng, Guo, and Kong 2011; Jiang, 
Yao, and Feng 2013), and lack evidence of their levels of risk-taking. One of the most 
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significant problems for the Chinese banking sector is the state-RZQHGEDQNV¶ level of non-
performing loans (NPLs), which has been largely overlooked until very recently (Allen et al. 
2014; Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013). This paper addresses this under-researched area and 
assesses Chinese banks¶ risk-taking by using the measures of NPLs and Z-score.  
Second, our study provides comprehensive and up-to-date evidence on the impacts of 
banking reforms in China. It uses a bigger sample of more Chinese commercial banks than 
previous empirical studies, and also takes into consideration the effect of the 2007-09 
financial crisis to which little attention has been paid. This study, therefore, enriches our 
understanding of the impacts of banking reforms and offers important implications for policy 
makers in China and other developing countries. Our results indicate that the banking reforms 
in 2005 had a significant impact on Chinese banks¶ performance. Specifically, banks tend to 
have improved profitability and lower risk, but have lower efficiency scores after 2005, 
suggesting that the reform measures adopted since 2005 are steps in the right direction of 
Chinese banking reform, but further reforms should be taken to improve the efficiency of 
Chinese banks. 
Third, we provide further evidence on bank ownership reform. Our results show that 
the Big 5 state-owned banks outperform banks with joint-stock ownership and city 
commercial banks in terms of overall risk as measured by Z-score, but underperform them 
over the entire study period when risk is measured by the NPLs. However, employing the 
difference-in-difference approach (DiD), we find that the Big 5 have lower NPLs than other 
banks during the post-reform period. This suggests that the ³Chinese model´ (Allen et al. 
2014) of banking reforms, which attracts strategic foreign investors and lists state-owned 
banks on stock exchanges yet keeps control ultimately in the hands of the government, 
appears to be an effective way of helping state-owned banks deal with the problem of NPLs.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the process of 
Chinese banking reform, and Section 3 discusses the literature related to the study. Our data, 
empirical models and variables used in the regression analysis are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The reform of the Chinese banking sector 
Established in 1949, the Chinese banking system initially followed a mono-bank model, in 
which the central bank, the 3HRSOH¶V %DQN RI &KLQD 3%2& DOVR SOD\HG WKH UROH RI
commercial banking to serve WKH QDWLRQ¶V centrally-planned economy (Berger, Hasan, and 
Zhou 2009; Zhang et al. 2013). In order to transform a policy-driven and monopolistic 
banking system into a competitive, market-oriented one (Dong et al. 2014), China has 
adopted a gradual reform approach since 1978.1 Four state-owned banks (SOCBs), namely 
the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), were split from the 
PBOC,2 and took over the commercial bank business, such as lending functions. 
From 1985 to 1992, a more intensely competitive environment was created by 
allowing the entry of new domestic banks and the expansion of the business sector of the four 
SOCBs. A number of joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) were established, and Rural 
Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) and Urban Credit Cooperatives (UCCs) were launched to serve 
individuals and small and medium-sized rural/urban enterprises. In 1994, three policy banks 
were established to separate policy lending from commercial lending, and the role of SOCBs 
DV µFRPPHUFLDO EDQNV¶ were clearly defined by the Commercial Bank Law of China. The 
government took several steps to help the SOCBs clean up their deteriorated balance sheets 
and promote commercial lending, e.g., establishing four state-owned asset management 
companies (AMCs) in 1999 to take nonperforming loans off the SOCBs at book value. 
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Since joining the WTO in December 2001, China has committed to opening up its 
banking sector to foreign competitors. The process of reform has been accelerated since 2003, 
and several significant policies have been implemented in order to improve the corporate 
governance and capital structure of state-owned banks, as well as to encourage foreign 
investment. The year 2005 is particularly remarkable, as it marked further opening up to 
foreign investors and the accelerated privatization of the SOCBs. 
In December 2005, China Bohai Bank was established, the first Chinese bank to be 
set up with a foreign minority stake. Around this time, foreign strategic investors also made 
deals to take on minority foreign ownership in SOCBs. For instance, in October 2005, a 
US$3.1 billion investment in the BOC was announced by the Royal Bank of Scotland, which 
accounted for approximately 10% of WKH %2&¶V ownership. By the end of 2006, about 30 
foreign financial institutions had purchased stakes in 21 Chinese commercial banks, with a 
total investment of US$19 billion (Okazaki 2007). Moreover, foreign banks have been treated 
similarly to domestic banks in many aspects since 2006, and the number of foreign bank 
entities has grown rapidly, almost doubling from 2004 to 2012 (Luo et al. 2015). 
The Chinese government encouraged the privatization of SOCBs not only by 
attracting foreign institutional investors as minority shareholders but also by listing them on 
stock exchanges. The Bank of Communications (BOCOM)3 was the first to take this route, 
issuing an IPO in Hong Kong in June 2005 (Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2009). After that, all 
SOCBs undertook successful IPOs and were listed on stock exchanges by 2010.4 By opening 
to foreign investors and going public, the wholly state-owned Chinese banks diversified their 
ownership and became joint-stock commercial banks.  
At present, the Chinese banking sector is dominated by the five largest SOCBs: ABC, 
BOC, CCB, ICBC and BOCOM. Apart from the Big 5 (previously the Big 4), 12 national 
domestic JSCBs and more than 100 regional city or rural commercial banks (CCBs or 
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RCBs) 5  comprise the domestic commercial banking system, which also includes newly 
established foreign banks, including Chinese-foreign joint-equity banks and banks with 
exclusively foreign ownership. 
A number of studies have examined how Chinese banks¶ performance was affected by 
financial reforms, though most have used data prior to 2005 (e.g., Ariff and Can 2008; 
García-Herrero, Gavilá, and Santabárbara 2009; Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2009; Lin and 
Zhang 2009; Jiang, Yao and Zhang 2009; Yao et al. 2007). Although banking reform in 
China is happening gradually, more radical reform measures have been adopted since 2005, 
such as further opening up to foreign investors and accelerated privatization of SOCBs. This 
paper attempts to fill this research gap by examining how different types of Chinese banks 
performed in terms of profitability, efficiency and risk before and after 2005, providing 
important evidence that is of interest to both academics and policy makers. 
This paper also attempts to assess the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on the 
performance impact of banking reforms, for which there is very little evidence in China. 
Wang et al. (2014) argue that the "Chinese model" of banking reform shows its positive 
impact on maintaining systemic stability during the global financial crisis. However, their 
study focuses only on large state-owned banks in China and does not present a full picture of 
how performance and risk in Chinese banks changed during periods of economic fluctuation. 
This paper, therefore, attempts to provide more comprehensive evidence on the 
impact of banking reforms in China by examining changes in the performance and risk of 
banks with different ownership structures before and after the 2005 reforms, and 
incorporating the effects of the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
 
3. Literature review 
3.1 Reform and bank performance 
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One of the main objectives of banking reform in both developed and developing countries is 
to improve the efficiency and profitability of banks (Berger and Humphrey 1997). 
Privatization of banks is expected to enhance the level of competition in the banking sector 
and in turn improve overall performance (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley 2005). Literature on 
whether banking reforms can achieve these initiatives has not, however, reached agreement. 
Early research in the US reveals unchanged or even decreased bank efficiency post-reform 
(e.g., Berger and Mester 1997), and similar results are found by several cross-county studies 
(e.g., Boubakri et al. 2005). 
On the other hand, Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou (2008) find a positive impact 
of banking reform on efficiency in newly acceded EU countries from 1994 to 2005. Improved 
cost efficiency brought about by banking reforms has also been reported in other countries, 
such as Australia (Sturm and Williams 2004). These results are consistent with the belief that 
banking reforms should be able to help banks achieve efficiency gains. In a less competitive 
market, banks are likely to behave inefficiently, as they can avoid minimizing cost without 
being forced out of the market (Fu and Heffernan 2009). Privatization and foreign bank 
penetration increase the level of competition in the banking sector and therefore encourage 
banks to operate more efficiently. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) examine the effects 
of the entry of foreign banks into different countries, and find that in most cases foreign entry 
forces domestic banks to improve their efficiency.  
Evidence on whether banking reform can improve profitability of banks is also 
ambiguous. Humphrey and Pulley (1997) find that deregulation of interest rates reduced 
profitability of US banks, while Boubakri et al. (2005) show that profitability of banks 
increases during post-privatisation period in 22 developing countries. Chronopoulos, Liu, 
McMillan, and Wilson (2015) examine how key regulatory events in the US affect the 
profitability of banks over the period 1984±2010. The authors find that adoption of the 
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Riegle±Neal IBBEA Act that eliminated federal restrictions on interstate banking resulted in 
reduced profits persistence and bank profit levels, while the introduction of GLB Act which 
allowed banks to diversify across business segments increased profits persistence and profit 
levels. 
Bank performance during the reform process appears to differ depending on its 
ownership structure. State-owned banks are found to underperform private banks in many 
countries (e.g., Cornett et al. 2010; Weintraub and Nakane 2005). Foreign-owned banks tend 
to outperform domestically owned banks in general, as they have the advantages of serving 
multinational customers, access to capital and use of technology (Berger 2007). However, 
contradictory evidence is provided by Naaborg and Lensink (2008), who find a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and bank profitability in a cross-section study in 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Whether the banking reforms in China have been an effective way to improve the 
performance of Chinese commercial banks remains doubtful, as empirical evidence tends to 
be limited and the impact of recent reforms is unclear (Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2009, Luo 
and Yao 2010). Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009) argue that minority foreign ownership may 
increase Chinese bank efficiency through improving corporate governance, technological 
advancement and risk management. Listing on stock exchanges can place market pressure on 
banks and encourage them to maximize value and improve information transparency, which 
in turn will result in efficiency gains. The authors find a strong favourable effect on 
efficiency from reducing state ownership of banks and increasing the role of foreign 
ownership in China during the period of 1994 to 2003. Similarly, Luo and Yao (2010) find 
that over 1999-2008, after listing, Chinese bank efficiency increased by almost 5%. Luo et al. 
(2015) show that foreign bank penetration is associated with improved profitability and 
efficiency for domestic banks in China during the period 2002 to 2011. Wang et al. (2014) 
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find that the overall efficiency of the Chinese banking system improves over the period 2003-
2011 because of the reforms. However, Fu and Heffernan (2009) provide contradictory 
evidence, showing that the X-efficiency of Chinese banks on average declines significantly 
during the period 1985 to 2002, and that most banks are operating below scale efficient levels. 
Conclusions regarding the difference in performance between banks with different 
ownership are also mixed (Wang et al. 2014). Lin and Zhang (2009) find that the Big 4 state-
owned banks are less profitable than other types of banks in China, and banks undergoing a 
foreign acquisition or public listing record better pre-event performance over the period of 
1997-2004. Ariff and Can¶V (2008) study shows that SOCBs on average are less cost- and 
profit-efficient than JSCBs over the period of 1995-2004. Nevertheless, using data for 
Chinese commercial banks from 1998 to 2007, Firth, Li, and Wang (2013) show that the 
financial performance of the Big 4 is not inferior to other banks. :DQJ HW DO¶V 
findings suggest that SOCBs appear to be overall more efficient than JSCBs, but such an 
efficiency difference is only seen in the pre-reform period, and is reduced over the post-
reform period. 
 
3.2 Reform and bank risk 
The traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis predicts that higher levels of 
market concentration are likely to lead to an increase in the market power of banks, which 
allows them to enjoy higher loan rates and lower deposit rates (Fu and Heffernan 2009). A 
more competitive banking sector resulting from privatization could result in a decline of bank 
chart value, which encourages bankers to take excessive risks and in turn increases EDQNV¶
default risk (Keeley 1990). Moreover, private shareholders are likely to engage in higher risk 
activities so as to maximize the value of the option/share (Boubakri et al. 2005), and to lend 
recklessly, as they will not bear the entire loss if the bank becomes insolvent (Clarke, Cull, 
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and Shirley 2005). The entry of foreign ownership will further enhance competition in the 
banking sector and increase banks¶ risk. The positive relationship between foreign ownership 
and bank risk-taking has been confirmed by some empirical studies (e.g., Lee and Hsieh 
2014). 
Nevertheless, privatization is also likely to change banks¶ risk-taking behaviour in a 
favourable way, as new shareholders will be better at monitoring the management of risk-
taking (Boubakri et al. 2005). State-owned banks are argued to be associated with high risk 
due to political interference (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley 2005; Dong et al. 2014), and the 
privatization of state-owned banks is likely to limit harmful government interference and 
improve the quality of lending through improved screening (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley 2005). 
Some empirical evidence shows that state-owned banks tend to have higher default risk than 
privately owned banks (e.g., Berger et al. 2005; Cornett et al. 2010). Moreover, foreign banks 
may have a positive influence on the stability of emerging market banking systems, as the 
entry of foreign investors is accompanied by advanced knowledge, skills and technology, and 
therefore contributes to an improved control and risk management environment in the 
domestic banking sector (Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg 2001). 
Extant literature on the effect of Chinese banking reforms mainly focuses on 
performance measures such as efficiency and profitability. Very few studies have 
LQYHVWLJDWHG WKH LPSDFW RI RZQHUVKLS VWUXFWXUH RQ &KLQHVH EDQNV¶ ULVN-taking behaviour 
during the reform process (e.g., Allen et al. 2014; Dong et al. 2014; Jia 2009), and their 
findings are contradictory. Dong et al. (2014) find that government-controlled banks tend to 
take more risks than other types of banks due to political intervention and weak risk 
management practice. Allen et al. (2014), on the other hand, argue that the government can 
impose non-profit goals via the state-owned banks, such as systemic stability of the financial 
system, and ensure continued lending in an adverse economic environment. This appears to 
11 
 
be of importance to the overall risk control of Chinese banking system. The authors suggest 
that the privatization of Chinese state-owned banks via listing on stock exchanges has been 
successful in improving their performance and risk management.  
As can be seen from the above discussion, empirical evidence on the impact of 
banking reforms in China is insufficient and inconclusive. Moreover, with the exception of 
Allen et al. (2014), there is a lack of research on the changes in bank performance and risk 
during and after the global financial crisis.  We intend to add more evidence to this under-
researched issue, focusing on an examination of how banking reforms in China affect 
Chinese banks¶performance and risk before and after 2005 and incorporating the 2007-2009 
financial crisis. This paper, therefore, is intended to extend knowledge of banking reforms in 
developing economies by providing comprehensive and up-to-date evidence. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Data 
The data used in this study is mainly collected from the BankScope database. It covers the 
period of 2000 to 2012, with more than 1,200 observations for a sample of 184 Chinese 
commercial banks. It includes data for 94 banks during the pre-regulation period (2000-2005) 
and for 172 banks during the period of 2006 to 2012. 
 
4.2 Model 
We apply OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at the bank level to examine the 
impact of banking reforms in 2005 on Chinese bankV¶ profitability, efficiency and risk-taking, 
comparing banks with different types of ownership structure. Six bank ownership indicators 
are used to differentiate Chinese banks, namely, the Big 5, joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCBs), city commercial banks (CCBs), rural commercial banks (RCBs), foreign banks and 
12 
 
banks with minority foreign ownership. We also introduce a dummy variable to examine 
whether listing on stock exchanges impacts bank performance and risk. Furthermore, 
variables of bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomics are included in the models 
since they are shown to be the determinants of bank performance and stability by previous 
studies. The basic regression model is specified as below: 
Bank performance/risk PHDVXUH &RQVWDQWȕ1* banking reform dummy 
                                                              ȕ2*ownership indicators  
                                                              + ȕ3*bank-specific characteristics 
                                                              + ȕ4*crisis dummy + Error term 
Where the banking reform dummy is 1 for the years after 2005 and 0 otherwise. 
Detailed definitions of the variables used in the model are shown in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
4.3 Bank performance measure 
Bank efficiency is normally measured by the distance of the financial institutions from a best-
practice frontier (Berger and Humphrey 1997; Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou 2008), 
using various parametric or non-parametric approaches.6 One of the most widely used non-
parametric methods is data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is based on a linear 
programming input-output technique and yields a convex production possibility set (Berger 
and Humphrey 1997; Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou 2008). The advantage of DEA 
approach is that it does not require the explicit specification of the functional form of the 
production frontier (Berger and Humphrey 1997). In view of the characteristics of the dataset 
such as the relatively small number of Chinese banks, the DEA approach is employed in our 
study to estimate the efficiency score of Chinese banks. It is calculated by three inputs 
(customer deposits and short-term funding, total costs, and equity capital, to adequately 
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account for the impact of risk) and three outputs (loans, other earning assets, and non-interest 
incomes). 
We use two measures of bank risk: the ratio of impaired loans to total assets and Z-
score. Z-score has been widely used in empirical literature to measure overall bank risk (e.g., 
Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2009; Dong et al. 2014; Liu and Wilson 2013; Soedarmono, 
Machrouh, and Tarazi 2013); it reflects the extent to which banks have enough capital to 
absorb losses (Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson 2013). The higher the Z-score value, the lower a 
EDQN¶V risk and the greater its stability. In order to capture the dynamics of bank risk, we 
follow the work of Liu and Wilson (2013), using a three-year rolling window to calculate the 
standard deviation of return on assets. Because the Z-score is highly skewed (Laeven and 
Levine 2009, Liu et al. 2013), the natural logarithm of it is used in our models. We also 
employ the ratio of impaired loans to total assets to measure non-performing loans (NPLs). 
The NPLs problem is a crucial issue in Chinese banking sector, but has been overlooked by 
existing studies (Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013). During the reform process, the Chinese 
government has taken several steps to help SOCBs clean up deteriorated balance sheets. It 
would be of interest to see whether the banking reforms have lowered the level of NPLs in 
China. 
Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are commonly used to measure 
bank profitability. As ROE disregards the greater risks associated with high leverage (low 
equity), which is determined to some extent by regulation (Athanasoglou, Brissimis, and 
Delis 2005), ROA is used to measure the profitability of banks in this study. 
Figure 1 shows the trend of bank performance over the sample period. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
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We also employ a difference-in-difference approach (DiD) (Meyer 1995; Angrist and 
Krueger 1999), which is widely used in applied economics to estimate the effect of policy 
intervention (Athey and Imbens 2006). DiD estimation identifies a specific intervention or 
treatment, and then compares the difference in outcomes before and after the intervention for 
groups affected by the intervention with the corresponding difference for unaffected groups 
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). It has the potential to circumvent many of the 
endogeneity problems that typically arise when making comparisons between heterogeneous 
individuals (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Meyer 1995). We use the year 2005 as 
the intervention and the Big 5 as the affected group, because some radical reform measures 
adopted in 2005 mainly applied to the privatization of SOCBs (see discussion in Section 2). 
 
4.4 Other control variables 
We consider a range of bank-specific characteristics that are likely to affect bank 
performance and risk, including market power of banks, bank size, cost ratio, diversification 
and liquidity. 
The previous literature has shown that competition can affect EDQNV¶ risk-taking, 
although the sign of the relationship is not agreed upon. One school of thought, which is well-
NQRZQ DV ³FRPSHWLWLRQ-IUDJLOLW\´, argues that an increase in competition encourages 
excessive risk-taking and a reduction in capital, thereby increasing the risk of bank failure 
(Keeley 1990). On the other hand, the ³competition-stability´ view argues that declined 
competition induces banks to offer loans at high rates and therefore increases the bankruptcy 
risk for bank borrowers, which in turn increases the risk of banks through risk-shifting 
mechanisms in the overall market (Soedarmono, Machrouh, and Tarazi 2013). Studies such 
as Boyd, De Nicoló, and Jalal (2006) and Soedarmono, Machrouh, and Tarazi (2013) provide 
empirical evidence in support of the competition-stability view. More recent literature finds 
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that the link between competition and bank risk is more complicated than a linear positive or 
negative relationship (e.g., Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson 2013). 
Considering the aforementioned literature, we incorporate a proxy of bank 
competition in our investigation. Following Liu and Wilson (2013), we use the Lerner index 
to measure the market power of banks. The higher the Lerner index value, the more market 
power a bank has and the lower the level of competition it faces.    
Bank size is likely to affect bank profitability, but the direction of influence tends to 
be ambiguous. Large banks have a competitive edge due to economies of scale and therefore 
tend to be more profitable (e.g., Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson 2004). However, large size 
may be related to an aggressive growth strategy and may make it hard to manage the bank 
(García-Herrero, Gavilá, and Santabárbara 2009). Likewise, literature on the risk effect of 
bank size offers contradictory suggestions. Larger banks are likely to be more stable than 
smaller banks due to the benefits of economies of scale and market power (Berger 1995), but 
they may have an incentive to increase their risk of operations (O'Hara and Shaw 1990). 
Cost-to-income (CI) ratio is expected to be negatively related to bank profitability and 
efficiency, and positively related to bank risk (e.g., Liu and Wilson 2010, 2013; Berger 1995). 
If managers choose less profitable assets and high-cost liabilities, profitability should 
decrease with a high cost ratio, thereby leading to low managerial efficiency and encouraging 
banks to take on more risk in order to increase returns (Boyd, De Nicoló, and Jalal 2006; Liu 
and Wilson 2013). Nevertheless, profits would decrease if banks with higher operational 
efficiency pass the low cost on to their customers in the form of lower loan rates and/or 
higher deposit rates (Liu and Wilson 2010).  
Diversification is argued to be associated with improved bank performance via 
economies of scale and scope, as well as the reduction of idiosyncratic risk (Stiroh 2010). 
However, Laeven and Levine's (2009) study suggests that volatile revenue streams generated 
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from less traditional financial activities may offset the positive risk-spreading benefits of 
diversification. Liu and Wilson (2013) find that diversified banks in Japan tend to be riskier 
than their focused counterparts. 
Bank liquidity may impact positively on bank profitability and efficiency, while 
impacting negatively on bank risk. Banks with a lower level of liquidity tend to carry more 
risk because they are more likely to make a fire-sale of their assets to meet demand for 
liquidity (Liu and Wilson 2010). However, Berger et al. (2005) claim that bank liquidity is 
affected to varying degrees by characteristics such as size and market power.  
We also include several macro environmental variables. The first is inflation. Liu and 
Wilson (2013) argue that higher inflation is likely to adversely affect the soundness of 
financial systems by distorting decision-making, exacerbating information asymmetry and 
introducing price volatility. GDP growth (GDPG) is another important determinant of bank 
performance. Liu and Wilson (2010) suggest that high economic growth improves business 
HQYLURQPHQW DQG ORZHUVEDQN HQWU\EDUULHUVZKLFKPD\GDPSHQEDQNV¶SURILWDELOLW\:LWK
regard to bank risk, improved economic conditions provide banks with more investment 
opportunities. As a result, banks may have incentives to take on riskier investment projects 
(Liu and Wilson 2013).    
We introduce a dummy variable to capture the impact of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis on Chinese banks¶ performance. Research shows that the performance of banks in some 
developed countries is negatively affected by adverse economic conditions (e.g., Kanas, 
Vasiliou, and Eriotis 2012). Compared with banks in developed countries, banks in China 
were much more conservative in derivatives investment and therefore were less influenced by 
the crisis (Luo et al. 2011).  State-ownership may be also an advantage during the financial 
crisis (Liu 2009; Allen et al. 2014). Liu (2009) argues that the health of the Chinese banking 
sector during the financial crisis was largely due to the government¶V involvement of setting 
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strict restrictions on financial institutions from avoiding inferior investments and cutting 
interest rates so as to encourage banks to expand lending. Allen et al. (2014) suggest that 
government ownership of Chinese banks enabled better enforcement of some non-profit goals 
(e.g., systemic stability and continued lending activity) in state-owned banks than in private 
banks during the recession and crisis period. 
 
4.5 Summary statistics and correlation  
The summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables for all sample banks and 
univariate tests of differences between pre-regulation and post-regulation periods are shown 
in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
The table shows that there were 94 banks in China during the pre-reform period 
(2000-2005); this increased to 172 during the post-reform period (2006-2012), indicating that 
banking reforms in 2005 and afterwards allowed more newly established domestic and 
foreign banks to enter the sector, thereby boosting the level of competition. The ration of 
mean Impaired Loans/TA is significantly higher before 2005 (5.20) than after (1.09), 
suggesting that there was a decline in the level of NPLs in Chinese banks after the 2005 
banking reforms. The overall profitability of Chinese banks as measured by ROA appears to 
have improved after 2005, as the mean ROA increases from 0.49 to 1.02.  
As for bank specific characteristics, the mean value of the Lerner index increases after 
regulation change in 2005 (from 30.44 to 40.33). This may suggest that state-owned banks 
gained more market power after the 2005 financial reform, and appears to be consistent with 
FuQJiþRYiD, Pessarossib, and Weilla (2013), who also find that the mean Lerner index 
increases in the Chinese banking industry over the period of 2002 to 2011.  
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We also observe that the mean values of both cost-to-income ratio and liquidity 
decrease after 2005, suggesting that Chinese banks in general have improved operational 
efficiency but lowered their level of liquidity during the post-reform period. 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix among all variables. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Main results 
We first examine the impact of the 2005 banking reforms on bank performance measures by 
comparing the Big 5 with non-Big 5 banks. 7  Dummy variables for banks with foreign 
minority ownership and listing on stock exchanges are also included in the regression model 
to assess whether the strategy of encouraging foreign investments and public listing 
significantly affected bank performance. Table 4 provides the baseline regression results. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
The coefficient on the post-2005 dummy variable is statistically significant at the 1% 
level in all models, suggesting that the banking reforms in 2005 significantly affected 
&KLQHVH EDQNV¶ SURILWDELOLW\ HIILFLHQF\ DQG ULVN Chinese banks in general tend to have 
improved profitability as measured by ROA, higher equity levels and lower risk as measured 
by both NPLs and Z-score after 2005. Deng, Guo, and Kong (2011) observe that the overall 
profitability of Chinese banks over the 2001-2007 period improved, due to the presence of 
foreign banks. Our results show that the profitability for Chinese banks went up and stayed 
up after the banking reform in 2005. This provides further evidence supporting the strategies 
of attracting foreign investment and privatizing SOCBs to improve the profitability of 
Chinese banks in general. 
19 
 
However, the efficiency of Chinese banks appears to decline significantly after 2005, 
indicating that the privatization and foreign investment strategies did not achieve the 
objective of improving the overall efficiency of Chinese banks. Similar findings are reported 
by Fu and Huffernan (2009) for Chinese banks during earlier reform periods. They argue that 
state lending policies and a lack of clarity about bankruptcy procedures contributed to rising 
amounts of bad debt, thereby resulting in inefficient reform from 1985-2002. Our results 
suggest that despite the radical reform measures adopted after 2005, the above problem seems 
to have persisted within the Chinese banking sector, and the overall efficiency level of 
Chinese banks failed to improve. 
Regarding ownership structure, it is noteworthy that banks with foreign minority 
ownership became more efficient and less risky than other banks. This is consistent with 
Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009), who argue that minority foreign ownership may increase 
Chinese bank efficiency through improving corporate governance, technological 
advancement and risk management. We also find that public listing is associated with higher 
profitability, greater equity level and lower risk as measured by Z-score, supporting the 
argument that listing on stock exchanges can substantially reduce the adverse effects of 
government ownership (Allen et al. 2014). 
We then conduct bank performance analysis prior to and after 2005 by comparing 
joint-stock, foreign, city and rural banks with the Big 5. Table 5 presents the results of the 
analysis. 
 [Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
Findings related to the post-2005 dummy variable, banks with foreign minority 
ownership and public listing are consistent with previous analysis. There is no significant 
difference in the efficiency levels of Big 5 banks and joint-stock banks, foreign banks, city 
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banks and rural banks. The Big 5 appear to be more profitable than joint-stock banks, but no 
difference is observed compared with other types of banks in terms of ROA. Our findings 
contradict some previous empirical studies on Chinese banks (e.g., Lin and Zhang 2009; Ariff 
and Can 2008), which observe a lower efficiency level for SOCBs than for other types of 
banks. Although the Big 5 are adversely affected by government intervention, they may 
benefit from government support (e.g., capital injection and non-performing loan removal) 
and scale economies. After accepting strategical foreign investment and listing on stock 
exchanges, the adverse impact of government intervention appears to be reduced. This may 
partially explain why the Big 5 are not inferior to other banks in terms of their profitability 
and efficiency.  
With regard to risk, the Big 5 appear to have a higher risk than joint-stock, foreign 
and city banks when risk is measured by NPLs during the entire study period. NPLs have 
been one of the most significant problems for Chinese banks, especially SOCBs. The total 
amount of NPLs within the Chinese banking sector was about 20-23% of GDP in 2000 and 
2001, which is much higher than in other large economies (Allen et al. 2014). Although steps 
have been taken to reduce the level of non-performing loans in state-owned banks (e.g., the 
establishment of AMCs in 1999), the Big 5 tend to behave less prudently in lending due to 
political intervention and low levels of accountability. The problem is more pronounced in 
rural commercial banks, as government intervention tends to be even stronger in rural China. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that rural commercial banks perform the worst in the 
abovementioned risk measure compared with other banks.  
However, the Big 5 tend to outperform joint-stock and city commercial banks in their 
overall risk level as measured by Z-score, suggesting that the Big 5 have more capital to 
absorb losses compared with joint-stock and city commercial banks. This can also be seen 
from the coefficient on the variable of equity to total asset.  
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We also observe that the dummy variable of the 2007-09 financial crisis is negatively 
related to Z-score and efficiency, indicating that Chinese banks experienced higher levels of 
overall risk and lower levels of efficiency during the period of the 2007-09 financial crisis 
than they did in non-crisis periods. During the financial crisis, the Chinese government cut 
interest rates twice and stimulated banks to expand their lending activities (Liu 2009), 
resulting in a large amount of bad debts in Chinese domestic banks, especially state-owned 
banks as they made most of the loans during the crisis. This may have worsened the overall 
risk level of Chinese banks. However, the increase in loans issued may have enhanced EDQNV¶
capacity to earn more in the market and therefore resulted in higher levels of profitability 
(Khan et al. 2011). This is confirmed by the positive relationship between the 2007-09 
financial crisis dummy and the ROA in both models.  
With regard to control variables, one notable observation is the impact of competition 
on bank performance and stability. We observe that, in both the two models, the Lerner index 
has a significant negative impact on NPLs and significant positive impacts on Z-score, ROA 
and the efficiency measure. This suggests that the more market power a bank has, the more 
profitable, more efficient and less risky it is. These UHVXOWVVXSSRUWWKH³FRPSHWLWLRQ-IUDJLOLW\´
view, and also provide evidence on the relation between competition and efficiency in the 
Chinese context where only a few empirical studies being conducted (e.g., Fu and Heffernan, 
)XQJiþRYiDHWDO 
 
5.2 Difference-in-Difference approach analysis 
The year 2005 is considered an exogenous shock after which more radical reform measures 
were adopted to accelerate the privatization of state-owned banks. We therefore expect the 
impact of the 2005 banking reforms on bank performance to be higher for the Big 5 than for 
their counterparts. To investigate this difference, we employ a difference-in-difference 
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approach, where the Big 5 are defined as the treatment group, and all other banks are defined 
as the control group. To account for time trends unrelated to the intervention, the change 
experienced by the treatment group is adjusted by the change experienced by the control 
group (Athey and Imbens 2006). We introduce a new variable Post*Big 5, which is the cross 
product of the two dummy variables of Post-2005 and Big 5. The coefficient of this 
interaction term is the key interest of this analysis. It represents the difference in the 
difference in outcome measures between the Big 5 and other banks before and after the 2005 
banking reform. Results of the DiD analysis are reported in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
The interaction term Post*Big 5 is negatively related to the ratio of impaired loans to 
assets. It suggests that although the Big 5 have higher risk as measured by NPLs than other 
non-state-owned banks during the entire time period of 2000-2012 (as discussed above), their 
level of NPLs tends to be reduced after the 2005 banking reforms. This could be a 
consequence of both government intervention and privatization of SOCBs. After first 
transferring NPLs to AMCs in 1999, additional transfers eventually brought the total NPLs of 
nearly 3.6 trillion yuan ($566 billion) off the SOCBs to the AMCs (Martin 2012). In addition, 
the involvement of foreign investors and public listing in 2005 helped the SCOBs to 
strengthen their corporate governance and risk management, thereby making their lending 
activities more prudent. Our findings suggest that, as long as the government remain the 
controlling shareholder of the SOCBs, attracting strategic foreign investors and going public 
can help state-owned banks to better deal with the problem of NPLs.  
The interaction term Post*Big 5 is also negatively related to the Z-score and the 
equity to asset ratio, indicating that the differences in bank stability and equity ratio between 
Big 5 and other banks also decreased after the 2005 banking reforms. These results confirm 
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the impact of banking reform on bank outcome, as we observe reduced differences across 
different outcome measures between Big 5 and other more privatized banks after the banking 
reforms.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Over the past several decades, the Chinese banking sector has undergone significant reforms. 
The year 2005 is remarkable in the process of reform; this year saw the adoption of some 
radical reform measures, such as significant liberalization to foreign ownership, listing on 
stock exchanges and other strategies. This paper aims to investigate the impact of banking 
reforms in 2005 on Chinese banks¶ profitability, efficiency and risk, comparing banks with 
different ownership structures. It also takes into consideration the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
Our results suggest that Chinese banks in general have improved their profitability 
and lowered their risk, but have also lowered their efficiency during the post-2005 period. It 
implies that the steps taken in Chinese banking reform since 2005 appear to be the right 
direction in terms of making banks more profitable and less risky, but that further reforms 
should be adopted to improve bank efficiency. 
We also provide evidence on the difference in performance and risk of Chinese banks 
with different ownership structures, showing that the Big 5 state-owned banks are not inferior 
to other types of banks in profitability and efficiency. One interesting finding is although the 
Big 5 underperform other banks in terms of the level of NPLs during the entire study period, 
they appear to perform better than their competitors over the post-reform period. This 
VXJJHVWVWKDWWKH³&KLQHVHPRGHO´ of banking reform can help improve risk management for 
state-owned banks. Compared with other developing countries, the Chinese banking sector is 
experiencing more gradual reform. Even with the accelerated privatization of state-owned 
banks, the Chinese government remains the majority controlling shareholder for the Big 5. 
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By attracting strategic foreign investors and going public, state-owned banks are better able 
to deal with their NPL problems and improve risk management. In addition, such a model 
DSSHDUV WR ZRUN ZHOO LQ PDLQWDLQLQJ &KLQHVH EDQNV¶ SURILWDELOLW\ GXULQJ ILQDQFLDO FULVLV
though they might be riskier because of government intervention. Consistent with some 
previous studies (e.g., Allen et al. 2014), our results provide supporting evidence of the 
positive effects of the ongoing banking reforms in China and offer important suggestions for 
policy makers in China and other developing countries. 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables 
  
Variable Definition  
Bank performance variables 
Impaired loans to total 
assets 
The ratio of impaired loans to total assets. 
ln(z-score)  Logarithm of Z-score. A measure of how many standard deviations a 
bank is away from exhausting its capital base. A higher value indicates 
higher overall bank stability. It is calculated at the three-year rolling 
time window. 
Equity to assets The ratio of bank equity to total assets 
Return on assets The ratio of bank net income after tax to total assets 
Standard deviation of 
ROA 
The standard deviation of return on assets, calculated at the three-year 
rolling time window. 
Efficiency Efficiency score is calculated from the DEA model, with three inputs 
(customer deposits and short-term funding, total costs, and equity 
capital, to adequately account for the impact of risk) and three outputs 
(loans, other earning assets, and non-interest incomes).  
Ownership indictors 
Big 5 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is one of the biggest five 
state-owned commercial banks and 0 otherwise.  
Joint A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a joint-stock commercial 
bank and 0 otherwise. 
City A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a city commercial bank 
and 0 otherwise.  
Rural A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a rural commercial bank 
and 0 otherwise.  
Foreign A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a foreign bank and 0 
otherwise. 
Foreign minority A dummy variable that equals 1 as from the year a bank has foreign 
minority ownership and 0 otherwise 
List A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is publicly listed on a stock 
exchange and 0 otherwise. 
 
Bank-specific characteristics 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Lerner The Lerner index measuring the mark-up of price over marginal costs. 
The higher the value, the more market power the bank has.  
Diversification The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income. 
Cost to income ratio The ratio of operating expenses over operating income. 
Liquidity The ratio of the sum of cash and for-sale securities to total assets. 
 
Other variables 
2007-09 financial crisis A dummy variable for the 2007-09 global financial crisis that equals 1 
for the years 2007 to 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
GDP growth Real GDP growth ± the percentage change of real GDP.  
Inflation Inflation ratio ± the percentage change of Consumer Price Index. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics for All Sample Banks and Univariate Tests of Differences between 
Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Periods 
Variable 
Full Sample Before Regulation Change After Regulation Change Difference in Means 
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD (abs) p-value 
Dependent Variables 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 Impaired loans/TA 1.81 0.75 2.86 5.20 3.97 4.30 1.09 0.56 1.74 4.11 0.00 
Ln(Z-score)* 2.84 2.76 0.57 2.76 2.66 0.71 2.87 2.78 0.53 -0.11 0.01 
standard deviation 
ROA 0.44 0.44 0.08 0.32 0.32 0.07 0.47 0.46 0.04 -0.15 0.00 
ROA 0.88 0.90 0.51 0.49 0.41 0.35 1.02 1.07 0.49 -0.53 0.00 
Equity/TA 8.19 6.02 7.77 6.91 4.30 9.11 8.64 6.40 7.20 -1.73 0.00 
Efficiency  0.82 0.82 0.11 0.83 0.83 0.10 0.82 0.82 0.11 0.00 0.87 
Independent Variables 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 Lerner 37.79 40.33 11.93 30.44 31.44 11.46 40.33 42.34 11.01 -9.90 0.00 
Size 10.83 10.64 1.97 10.55 10.15 2.18 10.93 10.80 1.88 -0.38 0.00 
Cost-to-income ratio 44.61 40.26 16.16 54.04 50.10 15.97 41.34 37.98 14.90 12.70 0.00 
Diversification 15.55 11.34 13.81 17.26 11.21 15.52 14.96 11.36 13.13 2.30 0.01 
Liquidity 12.36 10.71 9.86 16.72 17.25 9.69 10.85 8.13 9.47 5.87 0.00 
GDP growth 10.29 9.60 1.87 9.87 10.00 1.08 10.43 9.60 2.05 -0.56 0.00 
Inflation  4.65 3.93 2.98 3.44 2.61 2.05 5.07 6.68 3.13 -1.63 0.00 
Dummy Variables 
 
    
 
    
 
  
 
 Big 5 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.05 0.00 
Joint 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.09 0.00 
Foreign 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.15 0.00 0.36 -0.09 0.00 
City 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.72 1.00 0.45 -0.04 0.20 
Listed 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.29 0.00 0.46 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.16 0.00 
Foreign minority 0.27 0.00 0.45 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.32 0.00 0.47 -0.20 0.00 
2007-09 financial crisis 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.49 -0.42 0.00 
Observations 1206 310 896     
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for: (i) all sample banks (184 banks); (ii) the pre-reform period (2000-2005) (94 banks); and 
(iii) the post-reform period (2006-2012) (172 banks). Mean, Median and SD stand for the cross-sectional mean, median and standard 
deviation values of the individual bank time-series averages, respectively. The last two columns report the comparison analysis of 
dependent and control variables between pre- and post-reform periods. Difference in means is calculated as the difference between two 
periods¶ means in absolute (abs) values, with the p-values of the t-test on the equality of means reported in the last column. 
*The mean values of Z-score for the full sample, before regulation change and after regulation change are 17.12, 15.80 and 17.64, 
respectively, showing that the overall risk measured by Z-score increases by 1.84 during the post-reform period. 
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Table 3 
                 Correlation Matrix 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (132 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1)ROA 
                 (2)ln(Z-score) 0.198*** 
                (3)Efficiency 
-0.025 0.026 
               (4)Post-2005 0.452*** 0.290*** -0.005 
              (5)Lerner 0.645*** -0.061** 0.165*** 0.363*** 
             (6)Size 0.013 
-
0.254*** 0.388*** 0.085*** 0.332*** 
            (7)Cost-to-income 
ratio 
-
0.646*** 0.051* 
-
0.092*** 
-
0.344*** 
-
0.846*** 
-
0.221*** 
           (8)Diversification -0.076*** 0.041 0.104*** -0.073** 0.201*** 
-
0.108*** 0.188*** 
          (9)Liquidity -0.154*** 
-
0.195*** 
-
0.295*** 
-
0.260*** -0.043 0.042 0.083*** 0.124*** 
         (10)GDPGrowth 
-0.067** 
-
0.137*** 0.022 0.132*** 0.084*** 
-
0.176*** 
-
0.123*** -0.065** -0.010 
        (11)Inflation 0.209*** 0.046 -0.044 0.240*** 0.169*** -0.022 
-
0.190*** -0.040 -0.068** 0.404*** 
       (12)Big 5 
-0.045 
-
0.134*** 0.290*** 
-
0.099*** 0.135*** 0.498*** -0.016 0.012 0.033 -0.029 -0.041 
      (13)Joint -0.142*** 
-
0.159*** 0.228*** 
-
0.114*** 0.021 0.441*** -0.010 
-
0.105*** 
-
0.103*** -0.029 -0.043 
-
0.080*** 
     (14)Foreign -0.113*** 0.379*** 0.063** 0.124*** 
-
0.320*** 
-
0.250*** 0.317*** 0.184** 
-
0.198*** -0.074** 0.011 
-
0.080*** 
-
0.142*** 
    (15)City 0.205*** 
-
0.097*** 
-
0.341*** 0.037 0.156*** 
-
0.361*** 
-
0.216*** -0.062** 0.203*** 0.087*** 0.041 
-
0.331*** 
-
0.586*** 
-
0.588*** 
   (16)List -0.075*** 
-
0.187*** 0.373*** 
-
0.187*** 0.150*** 0.643*** 
-
0.076*** 
-
0.106*** 0.004 -0.060* 
-
0.080*** 0.468*** 0.573*** 
-
0.171*** 
-
0.500*** 
  (17)Foreign minority 
-0.046 0.231*** 0.253*** 0.194*** 
-
0.103*** 0.172*** 0.089*** 0.042 -0.207 -0.031 0.037 0.081*** 0.200*** 0.615*** 
-
0.628*** 0.251*** 
 (18)2007-09 financial 
crisis 0.159*** 0.076*** -0.042 0.397*** 0.098*** -0.072 
-
0.101*** -0.050* 
-
0.139*** 0.280*** 0.054* -0.038 -0.042 0.043 0.016 -0.074** 0.083*** 
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Table 4 Bank Performance Analysis Prior to and AIWHU&KLQD¶V%DQNLQJ5HIRUPVLQ
Comparing Big 5 and non-Big 5 banks 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Impaired 
loan/TA ln Z-score 
Std. Dev. 
ROA ROA Equity/TA Efficiency 
Post-2005 -3.268*** 0.218*** 0.114*** 0.267*** 3.811*** -0.034*** 
 
(-7.785) (3.932) (41.482) (7.447) (5.129) (-3.207) 
Big 5 3.101*** 0.607*** -0.002 0.101* 8.548*** 0.028 
 
(3.985) (4.522) (-0.738) (1.774) (5.315) (1.251) 
Size 0.092 -0.241*** 0.002*** -0.078*** -3.323*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.730) (-9.718) (3.261) (-7.671) (-6.482) (3.276) 
List 0.023 0.255*** -0.016*** 0.094* 4.538*** 0.024 
 
(0.045) (2.604) (-5.751) (1.861) (2.849) (1.357) 
Foreign minority -1.244*** 0.305*** 0.008*** -0.024 3.440*** 0.036*** 
 
(-4.270) (6.010) (4.132) (-0.698) (5.554) (3.989) 
2007-09 financial 
crisis 
0.095 -0.160*** 0.059*** 0.062*** -0.746** -0.014*** 
(0.742) (-6.084) (101.336) (2.698) (-2.059) (-2.655) 
Lernert-1 -0.060*** 0.012*** -0.000** 0.017*** 0.096** 0.002*** 
 
(-3.751) (4.317) (-2.156) (7.836) (2.061) (3.486) 
Cost-to-income ratiot-1 -0.001 0.008*** -0.001*** -0.010*** 0.116*** 0.001 
 
(-0.110) (3.565) (-5.222) (-6.249) (3.296) (1.425) 
Diversificationt-1 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.002* 0.010 0.002*** 
 
(0.193) (0.281) (-0.555) (1.909) (0.564) (5.069) 
Liquidityt-1 0.002 -0.006*** -0.000*** -0.002 -0.132*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.230) (-2.715) (-4.750) (-1.347) (-3.981) (-8.956) 
GDP growtht-1 0.199*** -0.114*** 0.005*** -0.079*** -0.950*** 0.009*** 
 
(3.896) (-13.846) (16.909) (-10.875) (-9.255) (5.252) 
Inflationt-1 -0.084*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.025*** 0.153*** -0.004*** 
 
(-5.110) (2.866) (24.109) (7.700) (3.447) (-5.407) 
Constant 6.895*** 3.962*** 0.371*** 1.057*** 28.968*** 0.608*** 
 
(3.553) (12.116) (30.132) (5.480) (4.783) (9.445) 
       Obs. 912 1135 1135 1206 1206 1195 
adj. R-sq 0.402 0.397 0.794 0.537 0.475 0.340 
Notes: This table reports the evidence of the impact of banking reforms in 2005 on banks¶ performance and 
risk in China, comparing Big 5 state-owned banks with non-state-owned banks. The dependent variables 
are impaired loans to total assets ratio, logarithm of Z-score (rolling at the three-year window) and its three 
components, i.e., return on assets (ROA), standard deviation of ROA (rolling at three-year window) and 
Equity/TA ratio, and Efficiency Score. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level, 
where *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Check 
Table 1 for detailed definitions of variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table 5 Bank Performance Analysis Prior to and After China¶V Banking Reforms in 2005 
Comparing Joint, Foreign, City and Rural Bank with the Big 5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Impaired 
loan/TA ln Z-score 
Std. Dev. 
ROA ROA Equity/TA Efficiency 
Post-2005 -3.220*** 0.200*** 0.113*** 0.263*** 3.958*** -0.036*** 
 
(-7.894) (3.782) (41.570) (7.444) (5.500) (-3.347) 
Joint -3.314*** -0.552*** 0.001 -0.133** -7.806*** -0.024 
 
(-4.013) (-3.746) (0.311) (-2.405) (-4.928) (-1.136) 
Foreign -4.425*** -0.215 0.005 -0.098 -8.060** 0.010 
 
(-3.874) (-1.039) (0.831) (-1.164) (-2.358) (0.246) 
City -3.751*** -0.576*** 0.004 -0.059 -10.902*** -0.015 
 
(-4.194) (-3.458) (1.161) (-0.862) (-4.537) (-0.466) 
Rural 0.908** -0.015 0.004** 0.104* 0.231 -0.004 
 
(2.109) (-0.282) (2.160) (1.701) (0.320) (-0.413) 
Size -0.010 -0.225*** 0.002*** -0.079*** -3.420*** 0.018*** 
 
(-0.073) (-7.291) (3.091) (-6.953) (-5.595) (3.053) 
List -0.133 0.303*** -0.014*** 0.141*** 3.533*** 0.032 
 
(-0.233) (3.977) (-4.677) (2.972) (3.011) (1.506) 
Foreign minority -0.825* 0.129** 0.009*** 0.011 2.053*** 0.024** 
 
(-1.875) (2.327) (2.935) (0.221) (3.347) (2.221) 
2007-09 financial  0.062 -0.153*** 0.059*** 0.062*** -0.740** -0.013** 
crisis (0.476) (-5.759) (99.447) (2.702) (-1.979) (-2.513) 
Lernert-1 -0.066*** 0.012*** -0.000** 0.016*** 0.096** 0.002*** 
 
(-4.199) (4.178) (-2.391) (7.533) (2.001) (3.364) 
Cost-to-income ratiot-1 -0.001 0.006*** -0.001*** -0.010*** 0.099*** 0.001 
 
(-0.115) (2.640) (-5.094) (-6.428) (2.663) (1.208) 
Diversificationt-1 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 0.002** 0.005 0.002*** 
 
(0.404) (-0.355) (-0.471) (2.088) (0.273) (4.865) 
Liquidityt-1 0.005 -0.005** -0.000*** -0.002 -0.111*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.602) (-2.255) (-4.617) (-1.356) (-3.351) (-8.857) 
GDP growtht-1 0.179*** -0.108*** 0.005*** -0.079*** -0.951*** 0.010*** 
 
(3.567) (-12.588) (16.588) (-10.767) (-8.071) (5.209) 
Inflationt-1 -0.081*** 0.007** 0.003*** 0.025*** 0.148*** -0.004*** 
 
(-5.240) (2.434) (23.698) (7.657) (3.171) (-5.409) 
Constant 12.026*** 4.218*** 0.384*** 0.982*** 38.873*** 0.632*** 
 
(5.316) (8.863) (25.558) (3.978) (4.489) (7.062) 
Obs. 912 1135 1135 1206 1206 1195 
adj. R-sq 0.414 0.426 0.794 0.543 0.487 0.340 
Notes: This table reports the results of the impact of banking reforms in 2005 on banks¶ performance and 
risk in China, comparing joint, foreign, city and rural commercial banks with Big 5 state-owned banks. 
The dependent variables are the ratio of impaired loans to total assets, the logarithm of Z-score (rolling at 
three-year window) and its three components, i.e., return on assets (ROA), standard deviation of ROA 
(rolling at three-year window) and Equity/TA ratio, and Efficiency Score. T-statistics are based on 
standard errors clustered at the bank level, where *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. Check Table 1 for detailed definitions of variables. 
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Table 6 Dif-in-Dif Analysis of Bank Performance Prior to and After China¶V 
Banking Reforms in 2005  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Impaired 
loan/TA 
ln Z-
score 
Std. 
Dev. 
ROA ROA Equity/TA Efficiency 
Post-2005 -2.961*** 0.231*** 0.113*** 0.261*** 3.935*** -0.033*** 
 
(-6.846) (4.077) (39.619) (7.144) (5.213) (-3.059) 
Big 5 5.253*** 0.771*** -0.009*** 0.034 9.931*** 0.039 
 
(3.643) (4.046) (-3.156) (0.488) (5.115) (1.336) 
Post*Big 5 -3.776*** -0.255** 0.012*** 0.125 -2.551** -0.020 
 
(-2.988) (-2.056) (3.980) (1.485) (-2.007) (-1.047) 
Size 0.084 -0.242*** 0.002*** -0.078*** -3.328*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.663) (-9.724) (3.279) (-7.639) (-6.486) (3.266) 
List 0.070 0.256*** -0.016*** 0.093* 4.558*** 0.024 
 
(0.136) (2.610) (-5.766) (1.834) (2.856) (1.366) 
Foreign minority -1.135*** 0.310*** 0.008*** -0.028 3.509*** 0.037*** 
 
(-4.129) (6.094) (4.060) (-0.794) (5.632) (3.992) 
2007-09 financial crisis 0.079 -0.160*** 0.059*** 0.063*** -0.749** -0.014*** 
 
(0.617) (-6.090) (101.529) (2.705) (-2.066) (-2.658) 
Lernert-1 -0.056*** 0.012*** -0.000** 0.017*** 0.098** 0.002*** 
 
(-3.630) (4.303) (-2.145) (7.806) (2.094) (3.501) 
Cost-to-income ratiot-1 -0.001 0.008*** -0.000*** -0.010*** 0.116*** 0.001 
 
(-0.040) (3.522) (-5.166) (-6.256) (3.289) (1.426) 
Diversificationt-1 0.004 0.000 -0.000 0.002* 0.012 0.002*** 
 
(0.441) (0.355) (-0.620) (1.812) (0.647) (5.125) 
Liquidityt-1 0.000 -0.006*** -0.000*** -0.002 -0.132*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.046) (-2.726) (-4.692) (-1.341) (-3.984) (-8.956) 
GDP growtht-1 0.209*** -0.114*** 0.005*** -0.079*** -0.947*** 0.009*** 
 
(4.246) (-13.759) (16.877) (-10.925) (-9.179) (5.256) 
Inflationt-1 -0.083*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.025*** 0.153*** -0.004*** 
 
(-5.031) (2.867) (24.092) (7.697) (3.444) (-5.407) 
Constant 6.525*** 3.958*** 0.371*** 1.062*** 28.837*** 0.607*** 
 
(3.388) (12.084) (30.074) (5.513) (4.747) (9.415) 
Obs. 912 1135 1135 1206 1206 1195 
adj. R-sq 0.420 0.399 0.794 0.537 0.476 0.340 
Notes: We consider China¶V banking reforms in 2005 as an exogenous shock and employ a difference-in-difference 
approach (Meyer 1995; Angrist and Krueger 1999) to study the causal effects of banking reforms in 2005 on bank 
performance and risk. The Big 5 state-owned banks are defined as the treatment group, while all other non-state-
owned banks are defined as the control group. The third dummy variable reported in the table, Post*Big 5, is the 
cross product of the two dummy variables of post-reform and Big 5. The dependent variables are the ratio of 
impaired loans to total assets, logarithm of Z-score (rolling at three-year window) and its three components, i.e., 
return on assets (ROA), standard deviation of ROA (rolling at three-year window) and Equity/TA ratio, and 
Efficiency Score. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level, where *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Check Table 1 for detailed definitions of 
variables. 
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Appendix %DQN3HUIRUPDQFH$QDO\VLV3ULRUWRDQG$IWHU&KLQD¶V%DQNLQJ5HIRUPVLQ 
  Fixed effects Random Effects 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  
Impaired 
loan/TA 
ln Z-
score 
Std. Dev. 
ROA ROA Equity/TA Efficiency 
Impaired 
loan/TA 
ln Z-
score 
Std. Dev. 
ROA ROA Equity/TA Efficiency 
             Post-2005 -1.761*** 0.141** 0.077*** 0.254*** 2.568*** -0.060*** -2.526*** 0.170*** 0.114*** 0.281*** 2.903*** -0.040*** 
 
(-3.665) (2.481) (16.362) (5.582) (3.692) (-5.791) (-6.870) (3.794) (41.684) (8.779) (5.861) (-4.517) 
Size -0.403 -0.188*** 0.017*** 0.000 -2.440*** 0.039*** -0.030 -0.214*** 0.002*** -0.056*** -2.741*** 0.023*** 
 
(-1.407) (-3.308) (6.814) (0.007) (-2.903) (5.038) (-0.197) (-7.460) (3.398) (-4.908) (-5.068) (5.316) 
Foreign minority -2.308** 0.078 0.039*** -0.046 1.991** 0.005 -1.973*** 0.222*** 0.008*** -0.029 2.982*** 0.023** 
 
(-2.520) (0.887) (4.624) (-0.678) (2.419) (0.368) (-4.049) (3.911) (4.148) (-0.774) (5.125) (2.307) 
2007-09 financial 
Crisis -0.086 -0.126*** 0.064*** 0.081*** -0.065 -0.009** 0.042 -0.144*** 0.059*** 0.066*** -0.284 -0.014*** 
 
(-0.573) (-4.396) (55.406) (3.542) (-0.165) (-1.993) (0.347) (-6.228) (101.717) (3.089) (-0.888) (-3.049) 
Lernert-1 -0.066*** 0.014*** -0.001* 0.012*** 0.157*** 0.003*** -0.061*** 0.014*** -0.000** 0.014*** 0.154*** 0.003*** 
 
(-2.995) (4.424) (-1.870) (4.542) (3.183) (5.694) (-3.512) (5.566) (-2.268) (7.100) (3.479) (5.242) 
Cost-to-income 
ratiot-1 0.012 0.004 -0.001*** -0.011*** 0.087*** 0.001*** 0.011 0.007*** -0.001*** -0.011*** 0.103*** 0.001** 
 
(0.654) (1.386) (-4.577) (-3.847) (2.976) (2.790) (0.809) (2.826) (-5.371) (-6.044) (4.143) (2.354) 
Diversificationt-1 0.014 -0.003* -0.000* 0.002* -0.024* 0.000 0.011 -0.001 -0.000 0.002** -0.017 0.001** 
 
(1.107) (-1.687) (-1.969) (1.837) (-1.679) (1.277) (1.107) (-1.072) (-0.596) (2.206) (-1.303) (2.447) 
Liquidityt-1 0.004 -0.001 -0.000*** -0.002 -0.039* -0.004*** 0.001 -0.003* -0.000*** -0.003* -0.057*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.316) (-0.683) (-3.128) (-1.315) (-1.799) (-10.116) (0.162) (-1.758) (-4.772) (-1.945) (-2.916) (-10.889) 
GDP growtht-1 0.093 -0.084*** 0.008*** -0.068*** -0.527*** 0.015*** 0.152*** -0.095*** 0.005*** -0.075*** -0.635*** 0.012*** 
 
(1.294) (-8.353) (12.721) (-7.771) (-4.520) (8.666) (2.710) (-12.663) (17.184) (-10.395) (-7.633) (7.910) 
Inflationt-1 -0.039** 0.002 0.002*** 0.025*** 0.050 -0.005*** -0.056*** 0.005* 0.003*** 0.025*** 0.075** -0.004*** 
 
(-2.383) (0.869) (13.329) (7.192) (1.467) (-6.932) (-4.024) (1.894) (24.146) (8.040) (2.351) (-6.875) 
Constant 9.578** 4.981*** 0.139*** 1.292** 28.401*** 0.158 4.932** 5.160*** 0.280*** 1.860*** 31.166*** 0.374*** 
 
(2.415) (6.402) (3.613) (2.486) (2.993) (1.559) (1.980) (12.360) (24.743) (8.939) (5.534) (5.620) 
Obs. 912 1135 1135 1206 1206 1195 912 1135 1135 1206 1206 1195 
adj. R-sq 0.459 0.222 0.829 0.581 0.171 0.303 
      
Notes: This table reports the results of the impact of regulation change in 2005 on bank's performance in China. We use both fixed effects and random effects method to 
estimate the regressions. The dependent variables are impaired loans to total assets ratio, logarithm of Z-score (rolling at three year window) and its three components, i.e., 
return on assets (ROA), standard deviation of ROA (rolling at three year window) and Equity/TA ratio, and Efficiency Score. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered 
at the bank level, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Check Table 1 for detailed definitions of variables. 
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Notes: 
                                                          
1
 For more detail on the process of Chinese banking reforms refer to Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009), Dong et al. (2014), Fu and 
Heffernan (2009) and Okazaki (2007). 
2
 The Bank of China was established as a private bank in 1912, but also had central bank responsibility before 1979. It was 
separated from the PBOC in 1979. The China Construction Bank was established in 1954 and the Agricultural Bank of China was 
re-established in 1979. In 1984, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China was established and the role of the PBOC as the 
centrDOEDQNZDVFOHDUO\GHILQHGLQGLFDWLQJWKDWWKH³WZR-WLHU´EDQNLQJV\VWHP)XDQG+HIIHUQDQZDVSUHOLPLQDULO\FUHDWHG 
3
 BOCOM used to be classed as a JSCB, but was redefined by the CBRC as a SOCB in 2006, considering that it is much larger 
than the other JSCBs and its share ownership is spread among different state-owned entities (Dong et al. 2014). 
4
 CCB issued IPOs in Hong Kong in October 2005, BOC issued IPOs in Hong Kong in June 2006 and then listed A-shares on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in July 2006, ICBC issued its IPOs in both Shanghai and Hong Kong in October 2006, and ABC listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in July 2010. 
5
 Regional city or rural commercial banks are owned by local government, local enterprises and households, offering commercial 
banking services to city-based or rural small to medium-sized enterprises and residents (Fu and Heffernan 2009). Some were 
created based on the restructuring and consolidation of urban or rural credit cooperatives (UCCs or RCCs) (Dong et al. 2014). 
6
 There are three main parametric approaches, including the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the distribution-free approach and 
the thick frontier approach (TFA), and two commonly used non-parametric approaches: the data envelopment analysis (DEA) and 
the free disposal hull approach (FDH). For a detailed discussion of methods used to measure bank efficiency refer to Berger and 
Humphrey (1997). 
7
 The results for both fixed and random effects are shown in the appendix. The results are consistent with our main results. The 
main reason we do not use fixed effects model in the first place is that the ownership dummy variables, e.g., Big5, etc., which are 
constant at firm level, will be dropped from the fixed effects regressions. 
